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Abstract: Two-qubit quantum codes have been suggested to obtain better efficiency and higher
loss tolerance in quantum key distribution. Here, we propose a two-qubit quantum key distribu-
tion protocol based on a mixed basis consisting of two Bell states and two states from the
computational basis. All states can be generated from a single entangled photon pair resource by
using local operations on only one auxiliary photon. Compared to other schemes it is also possi-
ble to deterministically discriminate all states using linear optics. Additionally, our protocol can
be implemented with today’s technology. When discussing the security of our protocol we find
a much improved resistance against certain attacks as compared to the standard BB84 protocol.
© 2018 Optical Society of America
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processing.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises secure information transfer based on the laws of
quantum physics. The most prominent protocol is the famous BB84 protocol [1]. It is proven to
be unconditionally secure provided that Alice and Bob make use of a genuine random number
generator [2] and that the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is below 11% [3]. The latter can be
increased to 12.7% for the six-state protocol [4]. With a two-way classical communications
QBER can be increased further and we shall come back to this point in Sec. 5. The secure QBER
can also be increased by increasing the capacity of the protocol so as to send 3 or 4 messages (in
contrast to 2 in BB84) via three or four states in a 3- or 4-dim space, achieving 22.7% or 25%
respectively. [5, 6].
Beyondmaximum tolerable QBER Eve (an eavesdropper) is undetectable when the losses are
significant, however, she might be undetectable even below that limit because weak laser pulses,
standardly used for implementingQKDwith single photons, enable her a beam-splitting [7, 8.5.3,
p. 440] and a photon-number splitting attack [7, 8.5.4, p. 441]. Also, recent commercial systems
based on BB84 protocol were shown to be hackable by tailored bright illumination and that
initiated “identifying and patching technological deficiencies” of BB84 implementation [8].
Therefore, time and again over the last decade a QKD with entangled photons has been
considered and reconsidered mostly as modifications of the so-called ping pong (pp) protocol
with two Bell states [9,10], by means of all four Bell states, i.e. via the superdense coding (SDC)
protocol [11], or even with three particle GHZ state [12]. It can be argued that “the potential of
entanglement-based protocols need to be seriously explored, especially taking into account the
rapid research progress [13] of entanglement light sources" [14]. On the other hand, correlated
detections of photons from the same down-converted pairs provide us with higher loss tolerance.
Various kinds of attack on these deterministic protocols were designed [10, 15, 16] and to
cope with them a number of modifications of the protocols were put forward [17–21]. Several
implementations have been carried out [14, 22] and the security considered [10, 15, 17–21]
although an unconditional one has not been reached.
One of the first proposed attacks on the pp protocol, given by Nguyen [17, 23], enables Eve
to read all the messages in the message mode “absolutely unnoticeable.” This kind of attack has
been addressed in [14, 21] and the protocol shown to be secure via its control mode. Nguyen’s
pp modification, called quantum dialog (in which both, Alice and Bob, send entangled photons
and messages) has been addressed in [23].
As we show in Sec. 4, Nguyen’s attack can be easily extended to the aforementioned four-Bell-
state pp protocol which was proposed to increase the capacity of the protocol—by a transfer of
2 bits via 4 messages—but which requires non-linear optics elements [24] (it cannot be carried
out with linear optics ones [25, 26]).
In this paper we propose a high-capacity (fourmessages) entanglement-basedpp-like protocol
which is not only resistant to Nguyen’s attack but also enables Alice and Bob to detect Eve during
their data exchange without switching to a separate control mode and which can be implemented
with linear optics elements because it is based on the mixed basis consisting of two Bell states
and two states from the computational basis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce the basis our states are in and a
description of our setup. In Sec. 3 we outline our protocol. In Sec. 4 we discuss the security of
the protocol and in Sec. 5 we summarize the results we achieved.
2. Mixed basis and setup
Let us start with introducing the mixed basis used in our protocol. We define it as a basis
consisting of the two Bell states
|χ1,2〉 = |Ψ∓〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉1 |V〉2 ∓ |V〉1 |H〉2) (1)
and the two computational basis states
|χ3〉 = |H〉1 |H〉2, |χ4〉 = |V〉1 |V〉2, (2)
where |H〉i (|V〉i) represents a horizontal (vertical) polarized photon in mode i.
A particular advantage of the mixed basis is that all four basis states can be deterministically
discriminated using only a few linear optical elements. The discrimination setup consists of a
non polarizing beam splitter (BS) and an additional polarizing beam splitter (PBS) in each of
its two output ports—see Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. (a) Setup for the mixed basis state discrimination. All four states of the mixed basis
can be deterministically discriminated by using only a few linear optic elements like a beam
splitter (BS), two polarizing beam splitters (PBS), and photon number resolving detectors
(D). (b) Setups for mixed basis encoding. All four mixed basis states can be generated from
Ψ
− by manipulating one of the two photons with one of the shown devices (see text). While
for χ1,2 the state preparation is fully deterministic, it is heralded for χ3,4.
The outputs of the PBSs are monitored by four photon number resolving detectors [27–29].
They can also be approximated by purely linear elements such as additional concatenated beam
splitters and single photon detectors [30–32].
In the case of |χ3〉 = |H〉1 |H〉2 and |χ4〉 = |V〉1 |V〉2 as input states of the discriminator, two
indistinguishable parallel polarized photons are sent to the BS from different sides, as shown in
Fig. 1(a). These photons will always exit the beam splitter at the same side, bunched together
and showing the well known Hong-Ou-Mandel interference effect [33]. Both bunched photons
keep the polarization direction they had before they entered the beam splitter [34–36]. On the
other hand, |χ2〉 = |Ψ+〉 photons bunch together behind the BS, but have different polarization
and split at a PBS behind the BS. In contrast, |χ1〉 = |Ψ−〉 photons split at the BS and are
subsequently transformed into opposite polarization states by the PBSs. Thus, all four mixed
basis states can be deterministically and unambiguously discriminated by means of photon
number resolving detectors.
In the following, we demonstrate how to prepare the mixed basis states solely from the state
|Ψ−〉 generated by an entangled photon source [30, 37]. In order to do this we introduce also
our QKD setup in Fig. 2, which consists of Alice’s and Bob’s part together with a quantum and
classical communication channel. Bob has an entangled photon source, a quantum delay, and a
mixed basis discriminator, as shown in Fig. 1(a).We assume that Bob’s entangled photon source
generates photon pairs in state |χ1〉 = |Ψ−〉. Bob sends one of the photons of the pair, the travel
photon, to Alice and keeps the other, the home photon, delayed for later joint measurements with
the travel photon returning from Alice.
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Fig. 2. QKD setup. Bob’s part consists of an entangled photon pair source generating the
stateΨ−, a quantum delay, a mixed basis discriminator and a removable HWP( pi
8
) aligned to
pi/8. Alice’s part consists of a mixed basis encoder and a removable HWP( pi
8
) also aligned
to pi/8. Alice and Bob exchange information on the bases and states over a classical channel.
Now, Alice can prepare any state of the mixed basis semi-deterministically by manipulating
the travel photon she receives from Bob. For this she has a mixed basis encoder, which consists
of an auxiliary on-demand single photon source and linear optical elements as shown in Fig. 1
(b). We will first consider the case when no additional HWP( pi
8
) on Bob’s or Alice’s side, shown
in Fig. 2, are put in.
To generate |χ1〉 = |Ψ−〉 nothing need be done—Fig. 1(b), top). To generate |χ2〉 = |Ψ+〉
Alice puts a half-wave plate [HWP(0◦)] into the photon path—Fig. 1(b), middle row. The HWP
changes the sign of the vertical polarization and thereby transforms |Ψ−〉 into |χ2〉 = |Ψ+〉. Thus,
|χ1,2〉 can be generated deterministically.
To generate |χ3,4〉 Alice places a PBS with single photon detectors on its output ports and
an auxiliary single photon source in her photon’s path—Fig. 1(b), lower row. With this, the
polarization of the photon is measured and thereby Bob’s home photon is projected into |V〉
if Alice’s measurement of the travel photon gives |H〉 and into |H〉 if Alice measured |V〉.
Subsequently, Alice replaces the destructively measured photon with a photon of opposite
polarization from an auxiliary single photon source. In doing so, it is possible to generate
|χ3〉 = |H〉1 |H〉2 and |χ4〉 = |V〉1 |V〉2 in a heralded way. State generation of |χ3,4〉 is hence
probabilistic in the sense that Alice obtains |H〉 or |V〉 after her PBS completely at random, but
as soon as she does obtain them, the |χ3,4〉 states are determined because she knows what she
sent and Bob will measure.
Let us now come back to the HWP( pi
8
) shown in Fig. 2. We assume that Alice and Bob,
independently of each other and randomly insert their HWPs aligned to pi/8 (Hadamard gates)
using a true quantum random number generator [2].
When both HWPs are inserted Bob will receive (in the absence of Eve) the same states as with
no HWP inserted (since two consecutiveHadamards yield the identity). These two arrangements
we call the same bases. The case when only Alice’s or only Bob’s HWPs are inserted we call
different bases.
With a delay Bob informs Alice of his choice of bases and Alice him of hers, over a classical
channel. The data obtained with different bases serve them as control data which they use to
catch Eve. Alice, also with a delay, informs Bob of exact values of all control data. Since the
capacity of the classical channels is practically unlimited compared to the quantum channel,
the quantity of classical information exchanged should not be a problem. Handling of messages
obtained with different bases and the corresponding control data we call the control mode.
3. Protocol
Now we describe how Alice and Bob using the setup from Fig. 2 proceed to securely exchange
a one-time-key. Our suggested protocol is the following:
1. Bob decides randomly about his basis by placing or not placing his HWP. He prepares the
two photon state |χ1〉, stores the home photon in his quantum delay, and sends the travel photon
to Alice through a quantum channel.
2. Alice decides randomly about her basis by placing or not placing her HWP. She decides to
perform the coding operation for |χ1〉, |χ2〉 or |χ3,4〉 (with genuine quantum randomness) with
probabilities P(χ1−4) = 1/4.
3. Bob measures the two qubit state by means of his mixed basis discriminator, and broadcasts
on a public channel if he placed his HWP or not.
4. Alice checks if the transmitted message is valid. This is the case for all |χ1−4〉 messages if
the bases were the same. If a message is valid, it is stored for later usage as one time key. The
selection is called sifting. If the bases are different, the measurement data are stored for later
usage as the control data. Alice announces the valid messages via a public channel with a delay.
She also announces the values of all control data.
5. Bob repeatedly restarts with (a) and with a delay he processes the control data to check for
Eve’s presence. If yes, they abort the transmission. If not, they distill the key. Thereupon they
carry out error correction and privacy amplification [3].
We would like to stress that even in the case of different bases Alice’s and Bob’smeasurements
are sensitive to detect the eavesdropper Eve. This is different from the BB84 protocol where part
of the valid data has to be sacrificed. Also no active switching between a message and control
mode has to be performed as in other pp-like protocols. This is an advantage since switching
may open the possibility to advanced eavesdropping attacks, in particular when Eve can hide
her presence in the message mode completely as shown below.
4. Security
As we mentioned in Sec. 1, Nguyen’s attack [17, p. 7, par. containing Eq. (2)] is a powerful
attack on pp-like protocols. We start with its brief presentation and only then we show that our
protocol is resistant to it.
As shown in Fig. 3, Eve delays the photons Bob sent to Alice and instead, sends her own
photons from her Ψ− source to Alice to encode them. Eve intercepts the photons Alice encoded,
measures them in her discriminator, encodes the read messages on the travel photons she kept
delayed and sends them to Bob. Eve can read off all the states sent by Alice in the p-p protocol
but cannot in the protocol of ours.
Our protocol is less susceptible to the above attack because:
1. When Alice prepares |χ3,4〉 states she collapses the states of both photons – her and Eve’s.
Eve can deterministically find out which states Alice’s and her photons collapsed to, but can
collapse Bob’s photon states into ones of her own photons only with a probability of 50% (by
means of her HWP);
2. When Alice and Bob put HWPs in their channel, then both Eve’s reading and resending
will be scrambled.
According to [6, 38, 39] we evaluate the condition for QKD to be secure in the presence of
Eve: IAB > IAE , where IAB (IAE ) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob (Eve). We
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Fig. 3. An efficient attack by Eve. Eve delays Bob’s photon and sends a photon from her own
Ψ
− (χ1) source. Alice prepares messages for Bob, but Eve deterministically reads them
off but can only probabilistically prepare states of Bob’s home photons. For instance, when
detecting that Alice prepared |χ3〉 (|HH〉) she can replicate it only with a 50:50 probability,
because Bob’s home photon is entangled with the travel photon handled by Eve. Nguyen’s
attack [17, p. 7, par. containing Eq. (2)] on pp can be viewed as the one shown here only
without HWPs and without the classical channel.
calculate them as follows.
When Alice and Bob are in the same basis with no HWPs inserted and Alice sends |χ1〉 or
|χ2〉 Eve can detect them and impose the same state on the Bob’s photons. Eve is not necessarily
always present in the line and we shall denote her presence by X ∈ [0, 1]; X = 0 means that
Eve is not present at all and X = 1 that she is always present. Thus, Bob will always receive
the correct |χ1〉 or |χ2〉, each with the probability 1/4, no matter whether Eve is present or
not (when she is in the line she fatefully transmits what she reads), but Eve will read |χ1,2〉
only with the probability X/4, i.e., only when she is in the line. When Alice sends |χ3〉 or |χ4〉
Eve can detect them but cannot impose the same state on the Bob’s photons with a probability
higher than 50%. So, Bob’s probability of receiving a correct state via Eve diminishes with her
presence X (probability falls as (2 − X)/8) and of receiving incorrect state increases with X .
Eve’s probability of receiving both correct and incorrect states increases with X .
We give an overview in Table 1 where we show the probabilities that what Alice ( j = 1, 2, 3, 4)
prepares will be received by Bob (m = 1, 2, 3, 4) weighted with Eve’s (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) presence
X , in the right-hand part entitled Bob as well as Eve’s probabilities of gaining Alice’s messages
again weighted with her presence X , in the left-hand part entitled Eve.
When Alice and Bob are in the same basis but with both HWPs inserted and Alice sends |χ1〉
or |χ2〉 her HWP( pi
8
) can be regarded as an operator acting on the states as follows
HWP|χ1,2〉 = 1
2
[|HH〉 ∓ |VV〉 − (|HV〉 ± |VH〉)] = 1√
2
(|χ3,4〉 − |χ2,1〉). (3)
At Eve’s BS Alice’s |χ1〉 will be transformed into the following one:
1
2
√
2
(|H〉1 |H〉1 − |V〉1 |V〉1 − |H〉2 |H〉2 + |V〉2 |V〉2) −
1
2
(|H〉1 |V〉1 − |H〉2 |V〉2)
=
1
2
(|Φ−〉11 − |Φ−〉22) −
1√
2
|χ2−〉, (4)
where the indices refer to the sides of BS. The states |χ2,3,4〉 transform similarly.
Table 1. Bob: Probabilities that Bob (m) will measure what Alice ( j) sends when HWPs
are not inserted, weighted by Eve’s (k) presence X ; Eve: Probabilities that Eve will read
messages that Alice sends and Bob receives weighted by her presence X ; When Eve is not
in the line we have X = 0 and when she is in the line all the time we have X = 1; Numbers
1,. . . ,4 in the top two rows and the column on the left hand side denote |χ1〉, . . . , |χ4〉.
Eve Bob
j 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
k 1 2 3 4 3 4 1 2 3 4 3 4
m
1 X
4
1
4
2 X
4
1
4
3 X
8
X
8
2−X
8
X
8
4 X
8
X
8
X
8
2−X
8
The probabilities of Eve reading a particular result for the states Alice sent will be
|χ1,2〉 −→ |χ2,1〉 : 50%; |χ3〉 : 25%; |χ4〉 : 25%. (5)
Alice’s HWP( pi
8
) changes |χ3,4〉 in a similar way and we obtain for the probabilities of Eve’s
reading:
|χ3,4〉 −→ |χ1〉 : 25%; |χ2〉 : 25%; |χ3,4〉 : 50%. (6)
In both cases Eve can resend |χ3,4〉 only randomly so that the probabilities for sending states
in the latter case will be:
|χ1〉 : 25%; |χ2〉 : 25%; |χ3〉 : 25%; |χ4〉 : 25%, (7)
i.e., her |χ3〉 resending will be indistinguishable from her |χ4〉 resending. In Table 2 we give the
probabilities for respective measurements with the HWPs inserted for |χ1〉 and |χ3〉 (denoted
by 1 and 3 in the top row). For example, the 2nd probability X/16 is the probability that Bob will
measure |χ1〉 when Alice prepared |χ1〉 > and Eve measured it as |χ2〉 and encoded it into a
pair which Bob will measure as |χ1〉 due to his HWP; the last probability X/64 is the probability
that Bob will measure |χ4〉 when Alice prepared |χ3〉 and Eve measured it as |χ3〉, but failed to
encode it and encoded |χ4〉 instead. Double entries divided by a diagonal line refer to Eve’s and
Bob’s reading, respectively. For example the entries in the first line, first column means Alice
sent |χ1〉 and Bob will measure |χ1〉 with the probability (X-1)/4 (i.e., only when Eve is in line,
not all the time). On the other hand Eve will never measure |χ1〉 in this case (0). A table with
probabilities for |χ2〉 and |χ4〉 looks similar and is therefore omitted.
Let us now calculate the mutual information between Alice and Bob. We make use of its
standard definition which is applicable to any communication protocol [40, Eq. (4)].
IAB := H(AB) + H(B) − H(A, B), (8)
where the Shannon entropy and the Shannon joint entropy are defined as [40, Sec. II]
H(B) = −
∑
i,n
p(ai, bn) log2 p(bn),
H(A, B) = −
∑
i,n
p(ai, bn) log2 p(ai, bn), (9)
where p(ai, bn) is the joint probability that A = ai and B = bn, and p(bn) are marginal
probabilities; base 2 of the logarithm gives the entropy and information in bits. H(AB) is
Table 2. Probabilities that Bob (m) will measure what Eve (k) sends him after her reading
what Alice ( j) prepared when HWPs are inserted. Alice’s similar sendings of |χ2,4〉 are not
shown here. Bob-columns and Eve-row contain marginal probabilities.
j 1 3
k 1 2 3 4 Bob 1 2 3 4 Bob
m
1
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
0
1−X
4 X
16
X
64
X
64
8−5X
32
X
32
X
64
X
64
X
16
2 X
64
X
64
X
32
X
32
X
64
X
64
X
16
3 X
32
X
32
X
16
X
64
X
64
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
X
32
8−7X
32 4−3X
16
4 X
32
X
32
X
16
X
64
X
64
X
32
X
16
Eve 0 X
8
X
16
X
16
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
X
4
1
4 X
16
X
16
X
16
X
16
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
X
4
1
4
the entropy calculated with respect to the messages received by Bob and therefore we have
H(AB) = H(B) = 4 14 log2 14 = 2 bits. We define IAE in an analogous way with H(AE) =
H(E) = 2X − X log2 X . We obtain the probabilities p(ai, bn) from the probabilities pjkm which
are given in Tables 1 and 2 (i is j for Alice and n is k for Eve or m for Bob).
After a somewhat lengthy but straightforward calculation we obtain the mutual information
after sifting with and without HWPs, the arithmetical means of which are given as the following
functions of X:
IAB(X) =
1
2
+
X
8
+
1
32
(
15X log2 X + 4(2 − X) log2(2 − x)
+ 2(4 − 3X) log2(4 − 3x) + (8 − 5X) log2(8 − 5x)
)
IAE (X) = 7X
8
− X log2 X . (10)
Their plots in Fig. 4 highlight the key result of our security analysis.
X
bits
I
I
(1) = 0.774
AE
AB
0.968
0.605
(1) = 0.875
1
2
IAB
IAE
( )X
(X )
Fig. 4. Mutual information of Alice and Bob, IAB(X), vs. the one of Alice and Eve IAE (X)
as functions of Eve’s presence, X , in the line.
When Eve is in the line all the time we have IAB(1) = 58 + 332 log2 3 = 0.774 and IAE (1) = 78 =
0.875. Remarkably, the difference between IAE (X) and IAB(X) is even higher for some values
of 0.605 < X < 1, for which IAE (X) > IAB(X).
Another method to estimate the security of our protocol is by means of the control mode.
When only Bob’s HWP is in place and Alice sends |χ3,4〉, according to Eq. (6), Eve will receive
them as |χ3,4〉 and Bob should receive them as |χ1〉 or |χ2〉 with the probability of 25%, each,
or as |χ3,4〉 with the probability of 50%. However, in half of the cases Eve will fail to resend
the latter states, i.e., she will send them incorrectly as |χ4,3〉 instead, with the probability of
25% and Bob will immediately detect Eve’s presence due to Alice’s classical information [see
Eq. (7)] via Eve’s bit-flips |χ3〉 → |χ4〉 (|χ4〉 → |χ3〉) with the probability of 1/4, and therefore
Eve’s probability of escaping detection during each of these two sendings is 1 − 1/4 = 3/4.
Within a complete set of 4 different messages |χ1−4〉 in the control mode Eve’s probability of
avoiding detection with either |χ1〉 or |χ2〉 is 1 and with |χ3〉 or |χ4〉 is 3/4. Alice’s sendings
come one after another and therefore the probabilities multiply and Eve will avoid detection
within a single cycle with the probability of 1× 1× (3/4) × (3/4) = (3/4)2 ≈ 0.56. After a more
detailed analysis we arrive at a result that with such repeated trials Eve’s probability of snatching
one character (8 bits) undetected is (0.53/1.54)8 ≈ 0.0002. We do not have to sacrifice data in
order to detect Eve in this way.
5. Discussion
To summarize, we introduced a high capacity (2 bits) protocol that relies on a mixed state basis
consisting of two Bell states and two states from the computational basis (a kind of blending
ping-pong (pp) and BB84-like protocols) which can be realized experimentally right away since
it relies only on off-the-shelf components. The protocol is supported by classical information
exchanged between Alice and Bob over a classical channel as shown in Fig. 2. When both HWPs
are inserted or none, photon states are in the same bases and the messages are being transferred.
When they are in different bases (only one of the HWPs is inserted) Alice and Bob will detect
Eve’s bit-flips with the probability of 99.98% during her snatching of her first byte of messages
as shown in Sec. 4. So, the different bases do not only support the transfer of messages but
function as a control mode as well, similarly to such a mode in the pp protocol and contrary to
BB84-like protocols where different bases transmissions are simply discarded (and a portion of
messages must be sacrificed for QBER verification).
Still, Eve can hide behind the exponential losses in the fibers and we carried out a security
analysis in Sec. 4 to estimate at which level of Eve’s presence Alice and Bob must abandon
the transmission for the chosen attack. The attack we chose to consider is a modification of
Nguyen’s attack [17] shown in Fig. 3. When applied to the standard pp-like protocols it can be
viewed as sending plain text messages protected by the control mode. For a modified two-state
pp protocol with a vacuum state it can be proved secure [14,21], but for the standard pp protocol
or its extension to four states there is no critical presence of Eve in the protocol since we have
constant and maximal Alice-Bob mutual information (IAB) for any Eve’s presence (0 < X < 1)
and without it and without having a new kind of privacy amplification algorithms developed for
absent critical presence (disturbance, QBER) we do not know when to abort the transmission
in such a protocol. In contrast, our protocol is resistant against such Nguyen’s attack because it
also contains entanglement-based computational basis states.
On the other hand, it is also fundamentally different from the BB84 because Eve cannot send
her photon particularly polarized without also affecting Bob’s photon’s polarization, i.e., she
cannot deterministically resend photons in a particular state of polarization evenwhen she knows
whether HWPs are inserted of not.
A modified pp protocol with a vacuum state proposed in [14,21] proved to be secure. In other
pp-like protocols [7, 10, 15, 16, 41–44], whenever one can define a critical disturbance, Eve’s
attacks influence IAB with respect to IAE more than in our protocol. As shown in Fig. 4, for
Eve’s presence of up to 60% (X < 0.605) we have IAB > IAE and the transfer is secure for the
considered attack. This Eve’s presence corresponds to the disturbance of 30% (D = X/2) which
is much higher than 11% and 12.7% of D (QBER) for four- and six-state BB84 protocol and
also higher than 22.7% and 25% for the 3- and 4-dim protocols mentioned in Sec. 1.
Recently, two-way classical communication channel was used to boost the critical QBER of
four- and six-state BB84 protocols to 26% and 30%, respectively [45]. Similar two-way classical
communication channel can be used to boost our critical QBER significantly over 30%. This is
the work in progress.
Taken together, the proposed protocol allows for much higher disturbance (QBER, Eve’s pres-
ence), at which the mutual information between Alice and Eve reaches the mutual information
between Alice and Bob, than other standard pp-like protocols. The price we have to pay for
such an increased robustness of the protocol is a limited distance since the efficiency of Bob
detecting both photons diminishes over four times the distance that a single photon would cover
in a BB84 implementation. Hence, right now, the protocol is suitable for urban inter-institutional
high-security networks.
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